Artículos

Guerra de octubre

Guerra de octubre


We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

El 6 de octubre de 1973, las fuerzas egipcias y sirias lanzaron un ataque sorpresa contra Israel. Dos días después, el ejército egipcio cruzó el Canal de Suez mientras las tropas sirias entraban en los Altos del Golán.

Las tropas israelíes contraatacaron el 8 de octubre. Cruzaron el Canal de Suez cerca de Ismailia y avanzaron hacia El Cairo. Los israelíes también recuperaron los Altos del Golán y se trasladaron hacia la capital siria.

La Guerra de Octubre llegó a su fin cuando las Naciones Unidas acordaron un alto el fuego el 24 de octubre. Al año siguiente, las tropas de la ONU establecieron una fuerza de mantenimiento de la paz en los Altos del Golán.

En septiembre de 1978, con el apoyo de Jimmy Carter, el presidente de los Estados Unidos, Menachem Begin de Israel y Anwar Sadat de Egipto firmaron un tratado de paz entre los dos países.


Guerras árabe-israelíes

Nuestros editores revisarán lo que ha enviado y determinarán si deben revisar el artículo.

Guerras árabe-israelíes, serie de conflictos militares entre fuerzas israelíes y varias fuerzas árabes, más notablemente en 1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 y 2006. Este artículo se centra en aquellos conflictos que involucraron a fuerzas árabes basadas fuera de Palestina. Para la cobertura de conflictos específicos del conflicto palestino-israelí, ver Israel, Palestina, Intifada y Franja de Gaza.


Contenido

A pesar de ocurrir en noviembre del calendario gregoriano, el evento se conoce más comúnmente como la "Revolución de Octubre" (Октябрьская революция) porque en ese momento Rusia todavía usaba el calendario juliano. El evento a veces se conoce como la "Revolución de noviembre", después de que la Unión Soviética modernizara su calendario. [3] [4] [5] Para evitar confusiones, tanto O.S como N.S. Se han dado fechas para eventos. Para obtener más detalles, consulte las fechas de estilo antiguo y nuevo.

Al principio, el evento fue referido como el "Golpe de Octubre" (Октябрьский переворот) o el "Levantamiento del III", como se ve en los documentos contemporáneos (por ejemplo, en las primeras ediciones de las obras completas de Lenin).

Revolución de febrero Editar

La Revolución de Febrero derrocó al zar Nicolás II de Rusia y reemplazó a su gobierno con el gobierno provisional ruso. Sin embargo, el gobierno provisional era débil y estaba dividido por disensiones internas. Continuó librando la Primera Guerra Mundial, que se volvió cada vez más impopular. Hubo una crisis a nivel nacional que afectó las relaciones sociales, económicas y políticas. Se había intensificado el desorden en la industria y el transporte y habían aumentado las dificultades para obtener provisiones. La producción industrial bruta en 1917 disminuyó en más del 36% de lo que había sido en 1914. En otoño, se cerraron hasta el 50% de todas las empresas en los Urales, Donbas y otros centros industriales, lo que provocó un desempleo masivo. Al mismo tiempo, el costo de vida aumentó considerablemente. Los salarios reales cayeron a aproximadamente el 50% de lo que habían sido en 1913. En octubre de 1917, la deuda nacional de Rusia había aumentado a 50 mil millones de rublos. De esto, las deudas con gobiernos extranjeros constituían más de 11 mil millones de rublos. El país enfrentó la amenaza de una quiebra financiera.

Disturbios de trabajadores, campesinos y soldados Editar

Durante junio, julio y agosto de 1917, era común escuchar a los rusos de la clase trabajadora hablar sobre su falta de confianza en el Gobierno Provisional. Los trabajadores de las fábricas de Rusia se sentían descontentos con la creciente escasez de alimentos, suministros y otros materiales. Culpaban a sus gerentes o capataces e incluso los atacaban en las fábricas. Los trabajadores culparon a muchas personas ricas e influyentes por la escasez general de alimentos y las malas condiciones de vida. Los trabajadores vieron a estos ricos y poderosos individuos como oponentes de la Revolución y los llamaron "burgueses", "capitalistas" e "imperialistas". [6]

En septiembre y octubre de 1917, hubo huelgas masivas de los trabajadores de Moscú y Petrogrado, los mineros del Donbás, los trabajadores del metal en los Urales, los trabajadores del petróleo en Bakú, los trabajadores del textil en la Región Industrial Central y los trabajadores del ferrocarril en 44 líneas ferroviarias. Solo en estos meses, más de un millón de trabajadores participaron en huelgas. Los trabajadores establecieron el control sobre la producción y distribución en muchas fábricas y plantas en una revolución social. [7] Los trabajadores organizaron estas huelgas a través de comités de fábrica. Los comités de fábrica representaron a los trabajadores y pudieron negociar mejores condiciones de trabajo, salarios y horarios. A pesar de que las condiciones en el lugar de trabajo pueden haber aumentado en calidad, la calidad de vida general de los trabajadores no estaba mejorando. Seguía habiendo escasez de alimentos y el aumento de los salarios que habían obtenido los trabajadores hacía poco para mantener a sus familias. [6]

En octubre de 1917, los levantamientos campesinos eran comunes. Para el otoño, el movimiento campesino contra los terratenientes se había extendido a 482 de 624 condados, o el 77% del país. A medida que avanzaba 1917, el campesinado comenzó a perder cada vez más la fe en que los socialrevolucionarios y los mencheviques les distribuirían la tierra. Negándose a seguir viviendo como antes, tomaron cada vez más medidas en sus propias manos, como lo demuestra el aumento del número y la militancia de las acciones campesinas. Desde principios de septiembre hasta la Revolución de Octubre hubo más de un tercio de las acciones campesinas que desde marzo. Más del 42% de todos los casos de destrucción (generalmente quema y confiscación de propiedad del patrimonio del propietario) registrados entre febrero y octubre ocurrieron en octubre. [8] Si bien los levantamientos variaron en severidad, no fueron infrecuentes los levantamientos completos y las tomas de la tierra. Las formas de protesta menos robustas incluyeron marchas en las mansiones de los terratenientes y las oficinas gubernamentales, así como retener y almacenar granos en lugar de venderlos. [9] Cuando el Gobierno Provisional envió destacamentos punitivos, sólo enfureció a los campesinos. En septiembre, las guarniciones de Petrogrado, Moscú y otras ciudades, los frentes norte y oeste, y los marineros de la Flota del Báltico declararon a través de su cuerpo representativo electo Tsentrobalt que no reconocían la autoridad del Gobierno Provisional y no llevarían a cabo cualquiera de sus comandos. [10]

Las esposas de los soldados fueron protagonistas clave en los disturbios en las aldeas. De 1914 a 1917, casi el 50% de los hombres sanos fueron enviados a la guerra y muchos murieron en el frente, lo que resultó en que muchas mujeres fueran jefas de familia. A menudo, cuando las asignaciones del gobierno se retrasaron y no fueron suficientes para cubrir los crecientes costos de los bienes, las esposas de los soldados enviaron masivas llamamientos al gobierno, que en gran medida no recibieron respuesta. El resultado fue la frustración y estas mujeres influyeron en la incitación de "disturbios de subsistencia", también conocidos como "disturbios por hambre", "pogromos" o "disturbios de baba". En estos disturbios, los ciudadanos confiscaron alimentos y recursos a los dueños de las tiendas, quienes creían que estaban cobrando precios injustos. Tras la intervención de la policía, los manifestantes respondieron con "rastrillos, palos, piedras y puños". [11]

Manifestaciones pacifistas Editar

En una nota diplomática del 1 de mayo, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Pavel Milyukov, expresó el deseo del Gobierno Provisional de continuar la guerra contra las Potencias Centrales "hasta una conclusión victoriosa", lo que suscitó una gran indignación. Del 1 al 4 de mayo, unos 100.000 obreros y soldados de Petrogrado y, después de ellos, los obreros y soldados de otras ciudades, encabezados por los bolcheviques, se manifestaron bajo pancartas que decían "¡Abajo la guerra!" y "¡Todo el poder a los soviets!" Las manifestaciones masivas resultaron en una crisis para el Gobierno Provisional. [12] El 1 de julio vio más manifestaciones, como lo hicieron unos 500.000 trabajadores y soldados en Petrogrado, exigiendo nuevamente "todo el poder a los soviets", "abajo la guerra" y "abajo los diez ministros capitalistas". El Gobierno Provisional abrió una ofensiva contra las Potencias Centrales el 1 de julio, que pronto colapsó. La noticia del fracaso de la ofensiva intensificó la lucha de los trabajadores y los soldados. El 15 de julio se inició una nueva crisis en el Gobierno Provisional. [ cita necesaria ]

Días de julio Editar

El 16 de julio, comenzaron en Petrogrado manifestaciones espontáneas de trabajadores y soldados, exigiendo la entrega del poder a los soviets. El Comité Central del Partido Laborista Socialdemócrata Ruso proporcionó liderazgo a los movimientos espontáneos. El 17 de julio, más de 500.000 personas participaron en lo que debía ser una manifestación pacífica en Petrogrado, las llamadas Jornadas de julio. El Gobierno Provisional, con el apoyo de los líderes mencheviques del Partido Socialista Revolucionario del Comité Ejecutivo de los Soviets de toda Rusia, ordenó un ataque armado contra los manifestantes, matando a cientos. [13]

Siguió un período de represión. Los días 5 y 6 de julio, se llevaron a cabo ataques contra las redacciones y las imprentas de Pravda y en el Palacio de Kshesinskaya, donde estaban ubicados el Comité Central y el Comité de los Bolcheviques de Petrogrado. El 7 de julio, el gobierno ordenó la detención y el juicio de Vladimir Lenin, quien se vio obligado a pasar a la clandestinidad, como lo había hecho durante el régimen zarista. Los bolcheviques fueron arrestados, los trabajadores desarmados y las unidades militares revolucionarias en Petrogrado fueron disueltas o enviadas al frente de guerra. El 12 de julio, el Gobierno Provisional publicó una ley que introducía la pena de muerte en el frente. El segundo gobierno de coalición se formó el 24 de julio, presidido por Alexander Kerensky. [14]

En respuesta a un llamamiento bolchevique, la clase trabajadora de Moscú inició una huelga de protesta de 400.000 trabajadores. Fueron apoyados por huelgas y manifestaciones de protesta de los trabajadores en Kiev, Jarkov, Nizhny Novgorod, Ekaterinburg y otras ciudades.

Asunto Kornilov Editar

En lo que se conoció como el asunto Kornilov, el general Lavr Kornilov, que había sido comandante en jefe desde el 18 de julio, con el acuerdo de Kerensky, ordenó a un ejército al mando de Aleksandr Krymov que marchara hacia Petrogrado para restablecer el orden. [15] Los detalles siguen siendo vagos, pero Kerensky pareció asustarse ante la posibilidad de que el ejército organizara un golpe de Estado y revirtió el orden. Por el contrario, el historiador Richard Pipes ha argumentado que el episodio fue diseñado por Kerensky. [16] El 27 de agosto, sintiéndose traicionado por el gobierno, Kornilov avanzó hacia Petrogrado. Con pocas tropas de sobra en el frente, Kerensky pidió ayuda al Soviet de Petrogrado. Bolcheviques, mencheviques y socialistas revolucionarios se enfrentaron al ejército y los convencieron de que se retiraran. [17] La ​​influencia de los bolcheviques sobre los trabajadores del ferrocarril y del telégrafo también resultó vital para detener el movimiento de tropas. La derecha se sintió traicionada y la izquierda resurgió.

Con Kornilov derrotado, la popularidad de los bolcheviques en los soviets creció significativamente, tanto en las áreas centrales como locales. El 31 de agosto, el Soviet de diputados obreros y soldados de Petrogrado —y el 5 de septiembre los diputados obreros soviéticos de Moscú— aprobaron las resoluciones bolcheviques sobre la cuestión del poder. Los bolcheviques obtuvieron la mayoría en los soviets de Briansk, Samara, Saratov, Tsaritsyn, Minsk, Kiev, Tashkent y otras ciudades.

Soporte alemán Editar

Vladimir Lenin, que había estado viviendo en el exilio en Suiza, con otros disidentes organizó un plan para negociar un pasaje para ellos a través de Alemania, con quien Rusia estaba entonces en guerra. Reconociendo que estos disidentes podrían causar problemas a sus enemigos rusos, el gobierno alemán acordó permitir que 32 ciudadanos rusos, entre ellos Lenin y su esposa, viajen en un vagón de tren sellado a través de su territorio. De acuerdo a Deutsche Welle:

El 7 de noviembre de 1917, un golpe de Estado pasó a la historia como la Revolución de Octubre. El gobierno interino fue derrocado, los soviéticos tomaron el poder y Rusia puso fin a la alianza militar de la Triple Entente con Francia y Gran Bretaña. Para Rusia, fue efectivamente el final de la guerra. Kaiser Wilhelm II había gastado alrededor de 500 millones de euros ($ 582 millones) en dinero de hoy para debilitar a su enemigo en tiempos de guerra. [18]

Planificación Editar

El 10 de octubre de 1917 (OS 23 de octubre, N.S.), el Comité Central de los bolcheviques votó 10-2 a favor de una resolución que decía que "un levantamiento armado es inevitable, y que el momento para ello está plenamente maduro". [19] En la reunión del Comité, Lenin discutió cómo el pueblo de Rusia había esperado lo suficiente para "un levantamiento armado", y era el momento de que los bolcheviques tomaran el poder. Lenin expresó su confianza en el éxito de la insurrección planeada. Su confianza provenía de meses de acumulación de poder bolchevique y elecciones exitosas en diferentes comités y consejos en las principales ciudades como Petrogrado y Moscú. [20]

Los bolcheviques crearon un comité militar revolucionario dentro del soviet de Petrogrado, dirigido por el presidente del soviet, Trotsky. El comité estaba integrado por trabajadores armados, marineros y soldados, y aseguraba el apoyo o la neutralidad de la guarnición capitalina. El comité planeó metódicamente ocupar lugares estratégicos de la ciudad, casi sin ocultar sus preparativos: el propio presidente del Gobierno Provisional, Kerensky, los conocía y algunos detalles, filtrados por Lev Kamenev y Grigory Zinoviev, fueron publicados en los periódicos. [21] [22]

Inicio Editar

En la madrugada del 24 de octubre (OS 6 de noviembre N.S.), un grupo de soldados leales al gobierno de Kerensky marchó sobre la imprenta del periódico bolchevique, Rabochiy puso (Camino del trabajador), incautación y destrucción de equipos de impresión y miles de periódicos. Poco después, el gobierno anunció el cierre inmediato de no solo Rabochiy puso pero también la izquierda Soldat, así como los periódicos de extrema derecha Zhivoe slovo y Novaia Rus. Se consideró que los editores y colaboradores de estos periódicos estaban llamando a la insurrección y serían procesados ​​por cargos criminales. [23]

En respuesta, a las 9 a.m., el Comité Militar-Revolucionario Bolchevique emitió un comunicado denunciando las acciones del gobierno. A las 10 de la mañana, los soldados alineados con los bolcheviques retomaron con éxito la Rabochiy puso imprenta. Kerensky respondió aproximadamente a las 3 p.m. esa tarde ordenando el levantamiento de todos los puentes de Petrogrado menos uno, una táctica utilizada por el gobierno varios meses antes durante las Jornadas de Julio. Lo que siguió fue una serie de enfrentamientos esporádicos por el control de los puentes, entre milicias de la Guardia Roja alineadas con el Comité Militar-Revolucionario y unidades militares aún leales al gobierno. Aproximadamente a las 5 p.m. el Comité Militar-Revolucionario tomó el Telégrafo Central de Petrogrado, dando a los bolcheviques el control de las comunicaciones a través de la ciudad. [23] [24]

El 25 de octubre (OS 7 de noviembre, N.S.) de 1917, los bolcheviques lideraron sus fuerzas en el levantamiento en Petrogrado (ahora San Petersburgo, entonces capital de Rusia) contra el Gobierno Provisional. El evento coincidió con la llegada de una flotilla pro bolchevique, compuesta principalmente por cinco destructores y sus tripulaciones, así como infantes de marina, al puerto de Petrogrado. En Kronstadt, los marineros anunciaron su lealtad a la insurrección bolchevique. Temprano en la mañana, desde su cuartel general fuertemente custodiado y con piquetes en el Palacio Smolny, el Comité Militar-Revolucionario designó el último de los lugares para ser asaltado o confiscado. Los Guardias Rojos capturaron sistemáticamente las principales instalaciones gubernamentales, instalaciones de comunicación clave y puntos estratégicos con poca oposición. La guarnición de Petrogrado y la mayoría de las unidades militares de la ciudad se unieron a la insurrección contra el Gobierno Provisional. [22] La insurrección fue cronometrada y organizada para entregar el poder estatal al Segundo Congreso de los Soviets de Diputados Obreros y Soldados de toda Rusia, que comenzó ese día.

Kerensky y el Gobierno Provisional fueron virtualmente impotentes para ofrecer una resistencia significativa. Los ferrocarriles y las estaciones de ferrocarril habían estado controlados por trabajadores y soldados soviéticos durante días, lo que hacía imposible los viajes en tren hacia y desde Petrogrado para los funcionarios del Gobierno Provisional. El Gobierno Provisional tampoco pudo localizar ningún vehículo en servicio. En la mañana de la insurrección, Kerensky buscó desesperadamente un medio de llegar a las fuerzas militares que esperaba que fueran amistosas con el Gobierno Provisional fuera de la ciudad y finalmente pidió prestado un automóvil Renault de la embajada estadounidense, que condujo desde el Palacio de Invierno, junto con una flecha perforadora. Kerensky pudo evadir los piquetes que se levantaban alrededor del palacio y conducir para encontrarse con los soldados que se acercaban. [23]

Cuando Kerensky dejó Petrogrado, Lenin escribió una proclama A los ciudadanos de Rusia, señalando que el Gobierno Provisional había sido derrocado por el Comité Militar Revolucionario. La proclama fue enviada por telégrafo a toda Rusia, incluso cuando los soldados prosoviéticos estaban tomando importantes centros de control en toda la ciudad. Una de las intenciones de Lenin era presentar a los miembros del congreso soviético, que se reunirían esa tarde, con un hecho consumado y así evitar nuevos debates sobre la sabiduría o la legitimidad de tomar el poder. [23]

Asalto al Palacio de Invierno Editar

Un asalto final contra el Palacio de Invierno, contra 3.000 cadetes, oficiales, cosacos y mujeres soldados, no fue resistido enérgicamente. [23] [25] Los bolcheviques retrasaron el asalto porque no pudieron encontrar artillería funcional y actuaron con moderación para evitar la violencia innecesaria. [26] A las 6:15 p.m., un gran grupo de cadetes de artillería abandonó el palacio, llevándose su artillería con ellos. A las 20:00 horas, 200 cosacos abandonaron el palacio y regresaron a sus cuarteles. [23]

Mientras el gabinete del gobierno provisional dentro del palacio debatía qué medidas tomar, los bolcheviques emitieron un ultimátum para rendirse. Trabajadores y soldados ocuparon la última de las estaciones de telégrafo, cortando las comunicaciones del gabinete con las fuerzas militares leales fuera de la ciudad. A medida que avanzaba la noche, multitudes de insurgentes rodearon el palacio y muchos se infiltraron en él. [23] A las 9:45 p.m, el crucero Aurora disparó un tiro en blanco desde el puerto. Algunos de los revolucionarios entraron al palacio a las 22:25 horas. y hubo una entrada masiva 3 horas después.

A las 2:10 a.m. del 26 de octubre, las fuerzas bolcheviques habían ganado el control. Los cadetes y los 140 voluntarios del Batallón de Mujeres se rindieron en lugar de resistir a los 40.000 efectivos atacantes. [27] [28] Después de disparos esporádicos en todo el edificio, el gabinete del Gobierno Provisional se rindió y fue encarcelado en la Fortaleza de Pedro y Pablo. El único miembro que no fue detenido fue el propio Kerensky, que ya había abandonado el palacio. [23] [29]

Con el Soviet de Petrogrado ahora en control del gobierno, la guarnición y el proletariado, el Segundo Congreso de los Soviets de toda Rusia celebró su sesión inaugural ese día, mientras Trotsky destituía del Congreso a los mencheviques y socialistas revolucionarios (SR) opositores.

El papel disputado de Dybenko Editar

Algunas fuentes sostienen que como líder de Tsentrobalt, Pavlo Dybenko jugó un papel crucial en la revuelta y que los diez buques de guerra que llegaron a la ciudad con diez mil marineros de la Flota Báltica fueron la fuerza que tomó el poder en Petrogrado y sofocó al Gobierno Provisional. . Los mismos marineros luego dispersaron por la fuerza el parlamento electo de Rusia, [30] y utilizaron fuego de ametralladora contra manifestantes en Petrogrado, [ cita necesaria ] matando a unos 100 manifestantes e hiriendo a varios cientos. [ cita necesaria ] Dybenko en sus memorias mencionó este evento como "varios disparos en el aire". Estos son cuestionados por varias fuentes, como Louise Bryant, [31] quien afirma que los medios de comunicación en Occidente en ese momento informaron que la desafortunada pérdida de vidas ocurrió en Moscú, no en Petrogrado, y el número fue mucho menor de lo sugerido anteriormente. En cuanto a los "varios disparos en el aire", hay poca evidencia que sugiera lo contrario.

Representación soviética posterior Editar

Si bien la toma del Palacio de Invierno ocurrió casi sin resistencia, los historiadores y funcionarios soviéticos más tarde tendieron a describir el evento en términos dramáticos y heroicos. [22] [32] [33] La recreación histórica titulada El asalto al Palacio de Invierno fue puesta en escena en 1920. Esta recreación, vista por 100.000 espectadores, sirvió de modelo para las películas oficiales que se hicieron más tarde, que mostraban feroces luchas durante el asalto al Palacio de Invierno, [34] aunque, en realidad, los insurgentes bolcheviques habían enfrentado poca oposición. [25]

Las historias posteriores del heroico "Asalto del Palacio de Invierno" y la "defensa del Palacio de Invierno" fueron propaganda de los publicistas bolcheviques. Pinturas grandiosas que representan el "Batallón de Mujeres" y fotografías tomadas de la película escenificada de Sergei Eisenstein que representa la versión "políticamente correcta" de los eventos de octubre en Petrogrado llegaron a ser tomados como verdad. [35]


Cumpleaños famosos

    Robert Devereux, tercer conde de Essex, general de la Guerra Civil Inglesa (muerto en 1646) Príncipe Rupert del Rin, soldado alemán, Comandante de la Guerra Civil Inglesa y primer gobernador de la Compañía de la Bahía de Hudson, nacido en Praga (muerto en 1682) Israel Putnam, general de la Guerra Revolucionaria Estadounidense (m. 1790)

Ethan Allen

1738-01-10 Ethan Allen, patriota de la Guerra Revolucionaria Estadounidense (lidera a los Green Mountain Boys), nacido en Litchfield, Connecticut (m. 1789)

Nathanael Greene

1742-08-07 Nathanael Greene, líder militar estadounidense (mayor general durante la Guerra Revolucionaria Estadounidense), nacido en Potowomut, Rhode Island (m. 1786)

    Thomas Grosvenor, héroe de la Guerra Revolucionaria Estadounidense (m. 1825) John Gunby, Soldado de Maryland en la Guerra Revolucionaria Estadounidense (m. 1807)

Casimir Pulaski

1747-03-06 Casimir Pulaski, líder militar polaco (llamado el padre de la caballería estadounidense), nacido en Varsovia, Polonia (m. 1779)

    Gerrit J Pijman, ministro de Guerra holandés (1798-1800, 1803-06) John André, oficial del ejército británico de la Guerra Revolucionaria Estadounidense, nacido en Londres (muerto en 1780) Stephen Girard, rescató bonos estadounidenses durante la Guerra de 1812 Gerhard JD von Scharnhorst, milt de Prusia / ministro de Guerra (1807-10) Georg Carl von Döbeln, teniente general sueco y héroe de guerra, nacido en Stora Torpa, Västergötland, Suecia (m. 1820) Dirk van Hogendorp, ministro de Guerra holandés, nacido en Heenvliet, Holanda (m. 1822) Joseph Fesch, cardenal francés / comisión de guerra / conde / senador

Laura Secord

1775-09-13 Laura Secord, heroína de guerra canadiense, nacida en Great Barrington, Massachusetts Bay (m. 1868)

    Stephen Decatur, héroe naval estadounidense (Guerra de 1812), nacido en Sinepuxent, Maryland († 1820) James Lawrence, héroe naval estadounidense (Guerra de 1812- "¡No renuncies al barco!"), Nacido en Burlington, Nueva Jersey. (m. 1813) General Dimitris Plapoutas, un revolucionario en la Guerra de Independencia griega (m. 1864) Henry Havelock, soldado británico (Guerra en Afganistán 1838-39), nacido en Bishopwearmouth, Condado de Durham (m. 1857) Simon Cameron, Senador estadounidense y secretario de guerra (Unión), nacido en Maytown, Pensilvania (m. 1889) John B. Floyd, gobernador estadounidense (Virginia), secretario de guerra (1857-60) y general confederado, nacido en Blacksburg, Virginia (m. 1863) Albert Taylor Bledsoe, sacerdote episcopal estadounidense y oficial del ejército confederado, nacido en Frankfurt, Kentucky (m. 1877) John A. Dahlgren, oficial e inventor de la Marina de los EE. UU. (Cañón Dahlgren de la guerra civil), nacido en Filadelfia, Pensilvania (m. 1870) Edwin Denison Morgan, Secretario de Guerra (Confederación), (m. 1883) John Archibald Campbell, jurista estadounidense y Supre Juez de la corte (1853-1861), nacido en Washington, Georgia (m. 1889) Edwin Stanton, Secretario de Guerra de los Estados Unidos durante la mayor parte de la Guerra Civil estadounidense (1861-65) y Fiscal General de los Estados Unidos (1860-61), nacido en Steubenville, Ohio (m. 1869) James Alexander Seddon, Guerra Secy (Confederación) , (m. 1880) Anna Ella Carroll, política estadounidense y escritora de la guerra civil (Reconstrucción), nacida en Pocomoke City, Maryland (m. 1894) LeRoy Pope Walker, abogado estadounidense y primer secretario de guerra de los Estados Confederados (1861), nacido en Huntsville, Alabama (m. 1884) Jeremy F Gilmer, General de División / Ingeniero Jefe Departamento de Guerra Confederado George Wythe Randolph, Secretario de Guerra de Estados Unidos para la Confederación, nacido en Charlottesville, Virginia (m. 1867) Anita Garibaldi, guerrera brasileña Esposa de Garibaldi ( War of Tatters), nacido en Laguna, Santa Catarina, Brasil (m. 1849) Gustavus Woodson Smith, General de División estadounidense (Ejército de los Estados Confederados), nacido en Georgetown, Kentucky (m. 1896) Thomas Alexander Scott, empresario estadounidense y subsecretario of War (Civil War), nacido en Peters Township, Pennsylvania (d . 1881) Pancha Carrasco, heroína de guerra costarricense (la primera mujer de Costa Rica en el ejército), nacida en Cartago, Costa Rica (m. 1890) Ambrose R. Wright, General de la Guerra Civil estadounidense, nacido en Louisville, Georgia (m. 1872) Gaston, marqués de Galliffet, general francés y ministro de Guerra (1899-1900), nacido en París, Francia (m. 1909) Julius Rodenberg [Levy], escritor alemán (Kriegs-Songs of War & amp Peace), nacido en Rodenberg, Alemania (m. 1914) Strong Vincent, oficial del ejército estadounidense (falleció en Little Round Top durante la Batalla de Gettysburg), nacido en Waterford, Pensilvania (m. 1863) William Harvey Carney, soldado de la Guerra Civil Estadounidense (primer afroamericano en recibir la Medalla de Honor del Congreso), nacido en Norfolk, Virginia (m. 1908) Alfred Townsend George, periodista de la Guerra Civil estadounidense, nacido en Georgetown, Delaware (m. m. 1959) Vasily Vereshchagin, pintor ruso (Guerra y paz), nacido en Cherepovets, Rusia (m. 1904) Ric hard Conner, ganador de la Medalla de Honor de la Guerra Civil Estadounidense (m. 1924) John J. Toffey, héroe de la Guerra Civil estadounidense (m. 1911) Julian Scott, artista estadounidense y ganador de la Medalla de Honor de la Guerra Civil, nacido en Johnson, Vermont (m. 1901) Ignacio Carrera Pinto, héroe de guerra chileno (m. 1882) ) Alfred von Tirpitz, arquitecto alemán de la Armada Imperial (Plan Tirpitz, Guerra sin restricciones de submarinos) y Gran Almirante de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en Küstrin, Provincia de Brandeburgo, Reino de Prusia (m. 1930)

Frank Kellogg

1856-12-22 Frank Kellogg, Secretario de Estado de EE. UU. (1925-29), intentó proscribir la guerra (Nobel 1929), nacido en Potsdam, Nueva York (m. 1937)

    Armando Diaz, mariscal italiano y ministro de Guerra (1922-24), nacido en Nápoles, Reino de Italia (m. 1928) George August Alexander Alting von Geusau, Ministro de Guerra holandés (1918-20), nacido en Arnhem, Países Bajos ( murió en 1937) Lindley M. Garrison, abogado estadounidense y 46 ° Secretario de Guerra de los Estados Unidos (1913-16), nacido en Camden, Nueva Jersey (muerto en 1932) Henry L. Stimson, estadista estadounidense (46 ° Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos), nacido en Nueva York, Nueva York (m. 1950) Sadao Araki, general japonés, Ministro de Guerra (1931-34), nacido en Tokio, Japón (m. 1966) Patrick J. Hurley, Secretario de Guerra de los Estados Unidos (m. 1963) ) Gervais Raoul Lufbery, piloto de combate y as de vuelo franco-estadounidense de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en Chamalières, Francia (m. 1918) Willis Augustus Lee, almirante estadounidense de la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Guadalcanal) y tirador deportivo (5 oros olímpicos en 1920), nacido en Natlee, Kentucky (m. 1945) Isaac Rosenberg, poeta de guerra inglés (Poemas de las trincheras) y artista, nacido en Bristol, Inglaterra (m. 1918) Oswald Boelcke, pilo alemán de la Primera Guerra Mundial t (d. 1916) Buck Jones [Charles F. Gebhart], actor estadounidense del Oeste (Just Pals, Forbidden Trails, War Horse), nacido en Vincennes, Indiana (m. 1942) Theo Osterkamp, ​​piloto de combate alemán de la Primera y Segunda Guerra Mundial, nacido en Düren, provincia del Rin, Reino de Prusia (m. 1975) Arthur Seyss-Inquart, canciller austríaco (década de 1930) / criminal de guerra Alfred Edwin McKay, as de vuelo canadiense de la Primera Guerra Mundial (m. 1917) Albert Jacka, soldado australiano, primer mundo australiano Ganador de la Victoria Cross de la Primera Guerra Mundial (m. 1932) Wilfred Owen, soldado inglés y poeta pacifista (Anthem for Doomed Youth, Futility), nacido en Oswestry, Shropshire, Inglaterra (m. 1918) Draža Mihailović, héroe y criminal de guerra serbio de la Segunda Guerra Mundial , nacido en Ivanjica, Serbia (m. 1946) King Vidor, director de cine estadounidense (War & amp Peace, Stella Dallas), nacido en Galveston, Texas (m. 1982) Ernst Friedrich, Breslau Alemania, pacifista (¡Guerra contra la guerra!) John Jay McCloy, abogado y banquero estadounidense (Secretario de Guerra 1941-45, presidente del Chase Manhattan Bank) Karl Allmenröder, alemán Ace volador de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en Wald, provincia del Rin, Alemania (m. 1917) Henry Allingham, supercentenario británico y veterano de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en Clapton, Londres (m. 2009) Douglas Campbell, aviador estadounidense y as de vuelo de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en San Francisco, California (m. 1990) Erich Loewenhardt, alemán as de vuelo de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en la provincia de Silesia, Polonia (m. 1918) Werner Voss, as de vuelo alemán de la Primera Guerra Mundial, nacido en Krefeld, Alemania (m. 1917) Frank Luke, piloto estadounidense de la Primera Guerra Mundial (m. 1918) Justin Tuveri, veterano italiano de la Primera Guerra Mundial (f. 2007)

Pieter Menten

1899-05-26 Pieter Menten, criminal de guerra holandés, nacido en Rotterfam, Países Bajos (m. 1987)


Pista diplomática

Para la última semana de octubre, las dos partes estaban listas y dispuestas a aceptar un acuerdo de alto el fuego.

Las estimaciones sitúan el número de soldados israelíes muertos en 2.600 y 8.800 heridos, una proporción significativamente mayor en comparación con la población israelí en ese momento, mientras que se informó que Egipto había perdido 7.700 hombres y Siria unos 3.500.

El 22 de octubre, el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU aprobó la Resolución 338, que pidió un alto el fuego y reafirmó la Resolución 242 aprobada en 1967, que pedía a Israel que se retirara de los territorios que ocupó en 1967.

Seis días después, los líderes militares israelíes y egipcios se reunieron para negociar un alto el fuego. Fue el primer encuentro entre representantes militares de los dos países en 25 años. Pero las negociaciones se volvieron tensas rápidamente a medida que continuaban las escaramuzas en la confusión del campo de batalla.

Luego, Estados Unidos inició intensos esfuerzos diplomáticos para asegurar acuerdos de separación entre Israel, Siria y Egipto, y les ofreció millones de dólares para llegar a tales acuerdos.

Henry Kissinger, el secretario de Estado de EE. UU., Voló de un país a otro en un esfuerzo por negociar un acuerdo de paz, en lo que se conoció como "Diplomacia lanzadera", un nuevo léxico que había entrado en el ámbito de la política internacional.

El martes 6 de noviembre, Kissinger voló a El Cairo para su primera reunión con Sadat. Cuatro días después, se firmó un acuerdo inicial que garantizaba convoyes diarios de suministros no militares a la ciudad de Suez y al 3er ejército egipcio sitiado.

Cuatro días después, se intercambiaron prisioneros de ambos bandos.

Cuando llegó el Año Nuevo, Kissinger regresó a la región para dar el siguiente paso en su gran plan para la retirada egipcio-israelí. El 11 de enero de 1974 llegó a la ciudad de Asuán, en el sur de Egipto, para encontrarse con Sadat. Al día siguiente, partió hacia Tel Aviv. Ambas partes aceptaron un acuerdo de separación.

Mientras tanto, los israelíes todavía ocupaban un saliente en las profundidades de Siria, no lejos de la capital, Damasco. Entonces, en mayo de 1974, Kissinger emprendió su segunda ronda de diplomacia de lanzadera, esta vez entre Damasco y Tel Aviv.

Después de casi un mes de duras conversaciones, Kissenger logró asegurar un segundo avance en la región cuando, el 28 de mayo, Israel aprobó un acuerdo de separación con Siria. Se firmó en Ginebra el 5 de junio, poniendo fin oficialmente a la guerra de octubre tras 243 días de combates.

Egipto y Siria recuperaron una parte de su territorio y se establecieron zonas de amortiguamiento de la ONU entre ellos e Israel.


Contenido

El holocausto nuclear fue el resultado directo del conflicto de una década que dejó exhaustos tanto a Estados Unidos como a China. Para 2077, una combinación de desgaste, pérdida de rutas de suministro y ofensivas llevadas a cabo por Estados Unidos en todo el frente dejó a las unidades chinas en Alaska varadas y sin refuerzos. The liberation of Anchorage spearheaded by winterized T-51 power armor units under the command of General Constantine Chase marked the end of the Anchorage Reclamation, after a decade of war. [Non-game 1] ΐ] Α] Β]

The campaign in mainland China, which began with the amphibious landings at Shantou in 2074, was reinvigorated by gaining ground in Alaska and the deployment of T-51 units. However, as American soldiers pushed deeper into the mainland, Chinese resistance increased. By October, the situation transitioned from a rout into a stalemate. Γ] Despite a decade of war, there was no end in sight. Billions of dollars and thousands of casualties were spent in vain, despite taxes and various wartime revenues ensuring the federal government was able to fund a standing army the likes of which the United States had never seen before. Δ] In a desperate attempt to bolster the offensive and break the stalemate, bases across the United States were sealed and troops were redeployed. & # 917 & # 93

The situation was made worse by the fact that the oligarchs ruling the United States retreated to remote locations around the globe, expecting a last-ditch nuclear strike from China at any moment. The oil rig off the Californian coast was claimed by the president and key members of the junta, a group which would later become the foundation of the Enclave. [Non-game 2] The United States was leaderless, continuing on simply due to inertia. In 2065, Robert House arrived at the conclusion that a nuclear war was inevitable by 2080 or sooner. & # 918 & # 93


Valley of Tears: The Yom Kippur War

On October 6th, 1973, Syria and Egypt launched simultaneous attacks on Israel. This became known by various names such as the Yom Kippur War, the October War, and the Ramadan War.

The goal was to at reclaim territory lost during the 1967 Six Day War and, upon success, move on to defeat and destroy the Jewish State. What transpired during the war was one of the most lopsided tank battles in history: the battle of the Valley of Tears in the Golan Heights.

Egypt and Syria, as well as Jordan, had mobilized their forces and threatened to attack Israel back in 1967. However, in response, Israel launched preemptive strikes against all three adversaries, pushing them back and rapidly taking the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

Yom Kippur War 1973 on the Golan heights

Despite some warning signs in 1973, the attack came as a surprise to Israel. Yom Kippur is the holiest day of the Jewish year, and the Israel Defense Forces were well below full strength.

Streaming into the Golan Heights was an armored Syrian force of 1,400 tanks, supported by 1,000 artillery pieces and air power. About 400 of the Syrian tanks were T-62s, state-of-the-art modern Soviet tanks at the time. The rest were a combination of older T-54 and T-55 units.

Abandoned Syrian T-62 tanks on the Golan Heights. Photo: ארכיון היסטו אגד CC BY 2.5

Standing in their way were two Israeli brigades tasked with holding off the invasion while reservists were mobilized to reinforce the front. They were the 7th Armored Brigade in the north and the 188th Barak Brigade to the south. Combined, they had 170 tanks and 70 artillery pieces. On the Israeli front line was a combination of Centurion and M-48 Patton tanks.

An Israeli Centurion tank upgraded as ‘Sho’t Kal’ tank. Photo: נחמן CC BY-SA 3.0

The initial Syrian assault included mine-clearing tanks and bridge layers used to clear Israeli defensive mines and ditches. Israel’s 7th Armored Brigade took the brunt of the attack, with 500 tanks and 700 armored personnel carriers advancing. Despite being vastly outnumbered and losing a number of their own tanks, Israeli forces managed to hold the line and inflict heavy Syrian casualties.

That night, the battle continued, with Syrian attacks and Israeli counterattacks. A couple of times the Israeli lines were penetrated, but persistent counterattacks managed to push back the invaders.

The Valley of Tears battle. Photo: Israel Defense Forces CC BY-SA 2.0

Heavy fighting continued in the northern Golan Heights for two more days. Despite increasingly bigger losses, the Syrian force continued to press.

By October 9, Israel was down to only six tanks protecting the northern section of the country. As the 7th Armored Brigade began to pull back, they were reinforced by a small force of 15 tanks. The Syrians saw the fresh Israeli equipment arriving and assumed it was the vanguard of major reinforcements. They immediately began to retreat.

Hundreds of shattered tanks and other military vehicles littered the countryside. That widespread destruction led an Israeli officer to refer to the area as the “Valley of Tears.”

Valley of Tears in 2010

In the southern Golan, on October 6th an estimated 600 Syrian tanks attempted to breach the line held by the Israeli Barak brigade with just 12 tanks. A defensive minefield and heavy artillery fire destroyed several dozen Syrian tanks in the initial attack.

Yet with overwhelming superiority, Syrian forces kept attacking. Israeli fighter jets were called in to even the odds but many were shot down by newly acquired Syrian anti-aircraft systems.

A destroyed Syrian T-55 tank at Nafakh on the Golan Heights. Photo by Israel Defense Forces -CC BY-SA 2.0

Heavy fighting continued into the night. The Israelis resorted to quick hit and run tactics with their limited tanks and artillery. This may have stopped Syrian forces from overrunning the southern Golan Heights that night. The Syrians apparently believed they were facing a larger enemy than was the case.

On October 7, Syrian tanks started another advance. With almost no tanks left, the Barak Brigade commander, Colonel Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, prepared for a last stand. He fought in a holding pattern against the advance until he was killed and the Brigade completely destroyed.

An abandoned tank in a memorial near the Valley of Tears, Golan Heights

The Barak Brigade’s last stand and a Syrian pause after the battle bought Israel more time. By that time Israeli reserve units were streaming to the front. Within a few days, the Syrian advance had become a full retreat.

Israel would win the war but at a costly price in casualties. Syria and Egypt were forced to retreat, but they had shown much stronger resolve than in 1967. The war ended on October 25th, 1973 with the same front lines as 1967. A few years later Israel and Egypt would sign a peace treaty, returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control. Israel and Syria technically remain at war to this day.


The Yom Kippur War: Background & Overview

After the exhilaration of the victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, Israelis became increasingly dispirited. The growing level of terrorism, combined with increasingly ominous threats from Egypt, made peace seem further away than ever. Rather than reconciling themselves to Israel&rsquos existence, the Arab states looked for a way to avenge the humiliation of their defeat. The Soviet Union was doing its share to stoke the flames of war by pouring arms into the region. And the Gulf Arab states were beginning to take greater control of their oil resources and use the revenues to flex their political muscle.

Sadat Cries Wolf

In 1971, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat raised the possibility of signing an agreement with Israel, provided that all the territories captured by the Israelis were returned. Later, many people would claim Israel missed an opportunity to avoid war, but the truth was that Sadat expected Israel to ignore the threats that led to the 1967 War and to capitulate to Egyptian demands without any guarantee of peace. The suggestion was a nonstarter from Israel's point of view. Moreover, Sadat could not negotiate an agreement until Egypt erased the shame of 1967.

For all the talk of peace, though, it was still violence that grabbed the headlines. During the summer of 1972, Palestinian terrorists infiltrated the Munich Olympics and murdered 11 Israeli athletes.

With no progress toward peace, Sadat began to say that war was inevitable and that he was prepared to sacrifice one million soldiers in the showdown with Israel. Throughout 1972 and for much of 1973, Sadat threatened war unless the United States forced Israel to accept his interpretation of Resolution 242 &mdash total Israeli withdrawal from territories taken in 1967.

Simultaneously, Sadat appealed to the Soviets to bring pressure on the United States and to provide Egypt with more offensive weapons. The Soviet Union was more interested in maintaining the appearance of détente with the United States than a confrontation in the Middle East therefore, it rejected Sadat&rsquos demands. Sadat&rsquos response was to abruptly expel approximately 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt.

In an April 1973 interview, Sadat again warned that he would renew the war with Israel. But it was the same threat he had made in 1971 and 1972, and most observers remained skeptical. In fact, almost up to the start of the shooting, no one expected a war. &ldquoThe news of the imminent attack on Israel took us completely by surprise,&rdquo President Nixon said later. &ldquoAs recently as the day before, the CIA had reported that war in the Middle East was unlikely.&rdquo

Jordan&rsquos King Hussein met with Prime Minister Golda Meir on September 25, 1973, supposedly to warn her of an impending war. Hosni Mubarak, however, claimed it was Yasser Arafat who warned the Israelis.

Had U.S. intelligence realized at the beginning of October 1973 that the Arabs were about to attack, Nixon might have been able to prevent the war through diplomacy or threats.

Golda&rsquos Fateful Decision

Despite the conventional wisdom that Israel was surprised by the attack that did eventually come, the truth is the Israelis began to prepare for battle on October 5 and were convinced war was imminent the following morning. But, like U.S. intelligence officials, Israeli analysts were skeptical about the threat of war.

According to documents declassified in 2012, the failure to anticipate the Arab attacks was a result of a number of intelligence failures. For example, Israeli soldiers on the southern front were given a secret document that provided 14 signals that would indicate an Egyptian attack was forthcoming. None of those indicators were apparent before the invastion. Similarly, in the north, a warning was passed on to the commander that Syria planned to attack on October 2. That intelligence could not be confirmed and was dismissed. The Egyptian buildup was also similar to one that occurred in May 1973 that had not led to war.

On October 4, a day before learning that Russian civilians were leaving Egypt and Syria, Military Intelligence reported the chances for war were low. Israel had a spy in Egypth however, Ashraf Marwan,** the son-in-law of ex-president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who passed on a warning to his Mossad handler in London that war was imminent a day-and-a-half before it started. The Mossad director, Zvi Zamir, was informed by his aide and planned to meet with his agent in London the next day. Zamir subsequently learned from Israeli Military Intelligence that Soviet scientists were preparing to leave Syria, which added weight to the report of pending war. Two weeks earlier, Israel learned that Russia was transferring Scud missiles to Egypt another worrisome sign. According to Zamir's aide, Alfred Eini, Marwan's warning of impending war was not passed on to the Prime Minister immediately because the Mossad thought it would be done by Military Intelligence. Zamir did not reach someone in the prime minister's office until a day later, hours before the attack.

Deputy Chief of Staff General Israel Tal feared war was coming and tried to convince his boss, Chief of Staff General David Elazar to take precautions and strengthen the front line with Egypt and call up reserves. If I am wrong and you are right, he said, we drafted them for nothing, inconvenienced them during the holidays and wasted money. That would be a shame, but not too bad. On the other hand if I am right and you are mistaken, we will face disaster.

It was not until 5 a.m. on October 6 that Elazar first recommended a full, immediate mobilization of forces and a preemptive air strike. He was overruled. A few hours later, a partial call-up of reserves was approved, but Meir still refused to authorize Elazar to take military action. She advised the U.S. ambassador of the situation and asked him to pass on the message that the Arabs should be restrained. Henry Kissinger, who now was secretary of state, subsequently appealed to Sadat and Syrian president Hafez Assad not to do anything precipitously. He also cautioned Meir not to shoot first. Meir found herself in a nearly impossible position. The intelligence community had not given her sufficient warning of the impending attack to adequately prepare the nation for war. Still, Israel&rsquos chances for victory and minimizing casualties could be greatly enhanced by a preemptive strike and the rapid mobilization of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). However, she feared that striking first, as Israel had done in 1967, might so anger the United States that Nixon would not support Israel&rsquos prosecution of the war or policies afterward. And, unlike 1967, she did not feel Israel could afford to go it alone.

Unholy War

On October 6, 1973 &mdash Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar (and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan) &mdash Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe was mobilized on Israel&rsquos borders. On the Golan Heights, approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli defenders with only three tanks were attacked by 600,000 Egyptian soldiers, backed by 2,000 tanks and 550 aircraft.

Hosni Mubarak, who was the Egyptian Air Force commander, said he started the war by attacking an Israeli communications base in his fighter jet six minutes before the rest of the Arab armies&rsquo surprise attack on the Jewish state began at 2:00 p.m. He said Sadat and two other people were the only ones informed of his mission.

At least nine Arab states, including four non&ndashMiddle Eastern nations (Libya, Sudan, Algeria, and Morocco), actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort. A few months before the attack, Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, an Iraqi division of some 18,000 men and several hundred tanks was deployed in the central Golan and participated in the October 16 attack against Israeli positions. Iraqi MiGs began operating over the Golan Heights as early as October 8 &mdash the third day of the war.

Besides serving as financial underwriters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait committed men to battle. A Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria, where it participated in fighting along the approaches to Damascus. Also violating Paris&rsquos ban on the transfer of French-made weapons, Libya sent Mirage fighters to Egypt. Other North African countries responded to Arab and Soviet calls to aid the front-line states. Algeria sent three aircraft squadrons of fighters and bombers, an armored brigade, and 150 tanks. Approximately 1,000 to 2,000 Tunisian soldiers were positioned in the Nile Delta. Sudan stationed 3,500 troops in southern Egypt, and Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, including 2,500 men to Syria.

Lebanese radar units were used by Syrian air defense forces. Lebanon also allowed Palestinian terrorists to shell Israeli civilian settlements from its territory. Palestinians fought on the Southern Front with the Egyptians and Kuwaitis.

In September 2013 shamed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak claimed that he personally started the Yom Kippur war during a secret mission during his time as an Egyptian air force commander. Mubarak stated that six munites before the large attack on Israel commenced including other Arab armies, he attacked an Israeli communications outpost in his fighter jet in the first attack of the war.

Hussein Doesn&rsquot Repeat His Mistake

Jordan&rsquos King Hussein, who apparently hadn&rsquot been informed of Egyptian and Syrian war plans, chose not to fight this round, correctly calculating that his forces were vastly inferior to the Israelis&rsquo. Hussein&rsquos decision was crucial to Israel&rsquos defense because it freed up forces that would otherwise have had to fight on a third front.

Still, Arab brotherhood required that Hussein contribute to the cause, so he sent two of his best units to Syria. Three Jordanian artillery batteries also participated in the assault, carried out by nearly 100 tanks.

Oil Becomes a Weapon

During the October war, the Arab oil-producing states imposed an embargo on oil exports to the United States, Portugal, and Holland because of their support for Israel. The impact was to cause a shortage of petroleum in the United States and a quadrupling of gas prices. Americans soon had to contend with long lines at gas stations.

Several U.S. oil companies that got most of their petroleum supplies from the Middle East, and depended on the goodwill of the Arab states to maintain their business relations in the region collaborated, in the embargo against their own nation. Oil company executives lobbied the Nixon administration to offer more support to the Arabs and less to Israel. They, along with state department Arabists, hoped to convince the public that Israel was to blame for the United States&rsquos economic hardships and that it was far more important for the United States to ally itself with the Arab states than with Israel.

The oil embargo was lifted in March 1974, but the United States and other Western nations continued to feel its effects for years to come.

The IDF Stages a Comeback

Thrown onto the defensive during the first two days of fighting, Israel mobilized its reserves and began to counterattack. In the south, Israeli forces were having little success in stopping the Egyptian onslaught. Still, the Sinai Desert offered a large buffer zone between the fighting and the heart of Israel.

The situation was different in the north, where the Syrians had swept across the Golan and could, in short order, threaten Israel&rsquos population centers. Consequently, most reserves meant for the Egyptian front were shifted to the Golan. The replenished Israeli forces stopped the Syrian advance, forced a retreat, and began their own march forward toward Damascus.

Superpower Chess

The Soviets gave their wholehearted political support to the Arab invasion. Starting as early as October 9, they also began a massive airlift of weapons, which ultimately totaled 8,000 tons of materiel. The United States had given Israel some ammunition and spare parts, but it resisted Israeli requests for greater assistance.

As the Soviets continued to pour weapons into the region, Kissinger decided that the United States could not afford to allow the Soviet Union&rsquos allies to win the war. The secretary of state wanted to show the Arabs they could never defeat Israel with the backing of the Soviets. He also couldn&rsquot afford to let U.S. adversaries win a victory over a U.S. ally. By sending arms to Israel, the United States could ensure an Israeli victory, hand the Soviets a defeat, and provide Washington with the leverage to influence a postwar settlement.

On October 12, Nixon ordered an emergency airlift &ndash Operation Nickel Grass &ndash to Israel. Cargo planes carrying spare parts, tanks, bombs, and helicopters flew round-the-clock to Israel. While the U.S. was resupplying Israel, the British under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, imposed an arms embargo. This inhibited Israel&rsquos ability to get spare parts for its British-made Centurion tanks. Heath also denied the U.S. access to British bases in Cyprus to gather intelligence and would not allow British bases to be used to refuel or resupply Israel. One positive outcome of the British policy was to stimulate the creation of Conservative Friends of Israel (Labor Friends of Israel was established in 1957)/

The resupply efforts were further hampered by America&rsquos other NATO allies who, capitulating to Arab threats, refused to allow American planes to use their air space. The one exception was Portugal, which as a consequence became the base for the operation. Between October 14 and November 14, 1973, 22,000 tons of equipment were transported to Israel by air and sea. The airlift alone involved 566 flights. To pay for this infusion of weapons, Nixon asked Congress for and received $2.2 billion in emergency aid for Israel.

The View from Egypt

In the greatest tank battle since the Germans and Russians fought at Kursk in World War II, roughly 1,000 Israeli and Egyptian tanks massed in the western Sinai from October 12 through 14. On October 14, Israeli forces destroyed 250 Egyptian tanks in the first 2 hours of fighting. By late afternoon, the Israeli forces had routed the enemy.

Meanwhile, Israeli General Ariel Sharon had been chomping at the bit to cross the Suez Canal but had been ordered not to do so until after the main Egyptian force had been defeated in the Sinai. With that mission accomplished, Israeli paratroopers snuck across the canal and established a bridgehead. By October 18, Israeli forces were marching with little opposition toward Cairo. For the Israelis, the crossing was a great psychological boost for the Egyptians, it was a humiliation.

About the same time, Israeli troops were on the outskirts of Damascus, easily within artillery range of the Syrian capital. Prime Minister Meir did not want to attack Damascus, so the IDF stopped its advance and focused its activities on recapturing Mount Hermon &mdash the highest peak in the region and a key Israeli radar and observation post that had fallen to the Syrians early in the fighting. On October 22, Israel once again controlled the Golan Heights.

Meanwhile, the air battles were one-sided. Israel lost 114 planes during the war &mdash only 20 in aerial combat. Israeli pilots shot down at least 450 Arab aircraft in dogfights.

The Brink of Nuclear War

As Israeli troops began to advance on Damascus, the Soviets started to panic. On October 12, the Soviet ambassador informed Kissinger that his government was placing troops on alert to defend Damascus. The situation grew even more tense over the next two weeks, as Israeli forces reversed the initial Egyptian gains in the Sinai and began to threaten Cairo. The Egyptian Third Army was surrounded, and Israel would not allow the Red Cross to bring in supplies. At this point, Sadat began to seek Soviet help in pressing Israel to accept a cease-fire.

On October 24, the Soviets threatened to intervene in the fighting. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that the Soviet airlift to Egypt had stopped and that it was possible the planes were being prepared to change the cargo from weapons to troops. Responding to the Soviet threat, Nixon put the U.S. military on alert, increasing its readiness for the deployment of conventional and nuclear forces.

The United States was in the midst of the political upheaval of the Watergate scandal, and some people believed Nixon was trying to divert attention from his political problems at home, but the danger of a U.S.&ndashSoviet conflict was real. In fact, this was probably the closest the superpowers ever came to a nuclear war other than the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Fortunately, the Soviets backed down and never sent troops to fight.

Saving the Losers

The Soviet Union showed no interest in initiating peacemaking efforts, so long as it looked like the Arabs might win. The same was true for UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim. After the situation on the battlefield changed in Israel&rsquos favor, however, desperate calls were made for the fighting to end.

On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for &ldquoall parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately.&rdquo The resolution also called for the implementation of Resolution 242. The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it.

Israel reluctantly complied with the cease-fire, largely because of U.S. pressure, but also because the next military moves would have been to attack the two Arab capitals, something few believed would be politically wise. By the end of the fighting, 2,688 Israeli soldiers had been killed. The one homefront casualty occurred when a FROG missile struck the pilots' headquartrs of the Rmat David air base. Combat deaths for Egypt and Syria totaled 7,700 and 3,500, respectively.

Disengagement Lays Groundwork For Peace

Ironically, the United States had helped save Israel by its resupply effort[md]and then rescued Egypt by forcing Israel to accept the cease-fire. Henry Kissinger had used U.S. power and diplomacy to try to bring about a war result that would allow Egyptians to erase the stain of 1967 without allowing them to win or Israel to humiliate them again.

In January 1974, Israel and Egypt negotiated a disengagement agreement (Sinai I) thanks to Kissinger&rsquos shuttle diplomacy &mdash so named because he flew back and forth between the two countries with American suggestions, as well as offers and counteroffers from the two governments. The Sinai I accord allowed the Egyptians to retain control of the Suez Canal, freed the Third Army, and drew a cease-fire line on the east side of the canal, with a buffer zone between the two forces.

A second disengagement agreement (Sinai II) was signed in September 1975, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from two strategic passes in the Sinai and some surrounding territory. The Egyptians were not allowed back into this neutral zone. Instead, U.S. peacekeepers were deployed to monitor the area.

Syria Fronts for the Rejectionists

The negotiations with the Syrians were more tortuous. It was not until May 1974 that a separation of forces agreement was signed that created a UN&ndashpoliced buffer zone, a reduction in troop deployment, and the return of the town of Kuneitra to Syria. And that came only after a renewal of fighting in March. Syria fired artillery at Israeli positions between March and May, during which 37 more Israeli soldiers were killed.

The United States rewarded Syria for the agreement with a modest grant of financial assistance[md]the first in 30 years &mdash in hopes of building a new relationship with the regime of Hafez Assad and encouraging him to negotiate a peace agreement. As Nixon&rsquos successors would also discover, Assad was happy to take whatever the United States was willing to offer, but he gave nothing in return. Rather than join the peace process, Assad became one of the leaders of the Rejectionist Front.

Assad was also determined to impede Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. He feared that an agreement between them would reduce Egypt&rsquos willingness to fight for the Arab cause and that Sadat would accept a separate deal with Israel that would not address Syrian grievances.

Israel&rsquos Political Earthquake

The fact that the Arabs had succeeded in surprising the IDF and inflicting heavy losses in the early part of the war against the supposedly invincible Israeli army was a traumatic experience for Israel. Its government reacted to the public&rsquos calls for an inquiry by establishing a commission chaired by Shimon Agranat, the president of Israel&rsquos Supreme Court.

The Agranat Commission concluded that Israeli intelligence had sufficient warning of the impending attack, but, for a variety of reasons, had failed to interpret the in-formation correctly. The commission did not assess the role of Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, but the public viewed them as the officials who were actually responsible for the mistakes that were made. Chief of Staff Elazar bore the brunt of the commission&rsquos blame and resigned.

The report also called for the removal of the head of IDF intelligence Eliyahu Zeira and his deputy, Arye Shalev. It was not until 2020, however, that the public learned that the commission found that Zeira made a critical error by not activating &ldquospecial means&rdquo in time to learn about the impending Egyptian attack. &ldquoIt was his obligation to enable contact to be made with these sources so as to do everything possible to determine the enemy&rsquos intentions,&rdquo the document reads. &ldquoA mistake that leads to the non-utilization of a vital intelligence source when it is most needed is a severe professional failure.&rdquo The commission also accused Zeira of misleading Israel&rsquos military and political leaders into thinking he had activated the &ldquospecial means.&rdquo

According to Ofer Aderet, &ldquoThe exact nature of these means remains unclear to this day. Various reports, both in Israel and abroad, say they were sophisticated listening devices that could record telephone calls by Egyptian army officers. On the eve of the war in October 1973, Israel&rsquos decision-makers were sure the technology would give the country a 48-hour warning.&rdquo

The public was angered by what many viewed as scapegoating career military officials for the mistakes of their political leaders. This outrage ultimately led Meir to resign. Dayan would have been the logical heir, but his reputation was now in tatters. The alternatives of the dominant Labor Party for a successor came down to a choice between two very different men. One, Minister of Information Shimon Peres, was a popular nonmilitary man who had played a key role in building the nation&rsquos military might through his diplomatic skills. The other was Yitzhak Rabin, a native-born Israeli and military leader from the days of the Haganah, who had served as chief of staff during the Six-Day War and later as ambassador to Washington. In a tight election that fueled a 20-year political rivalry, Rabin was chosen to be prime minister.

Egypt Saves Face

Although Egypt lost the war, with Israeli troops prepared to march on Cairo and the Third Army saved by the United States from annihilation, Egyptians saw the battle as a victory for them. They had surprised the arrogant Israelis and nearly defeated them. If not for U.S. support, many believed, they would have driven the Jews into the sea. Sadat did not seem to have that as his objective. It was more important for him to erase the humiliation of 1967. As Egyptian chief of staff Sa&rsquoad Shazli, said on October 8, 1973, &ldquoThe war has retrieved Arab honor.&rdquo This psychological shift was critical to Sadat's ability to enter negotiations later to reach a peace agreement with Israel.

Fuentes: Mitchell G. Bard, La guía completa para idiotas sobre conflictos en Oriente Medio. 4ª Edición. Nueva York: Alpha Books, 2008
Roi Mandel, &ldquoDeclassified documents reveal failures of Yom Kippur War,&rdquo Ynet, (September 25, 2012)
Yaakov Lappin, &ldquoDeclassified Yom Kippur papers reveal failures,&rdquo Jerusalem Post, (September 21, 2012)
Amir Oren, Yom Kippur War Redux / How Israeli and U.S. leaders ignored the Arab drums of war in 1973, Haaretz, (October 8, 2011):
Neville Teller, &ldquoThe Conservative Friends of Israel,&rdquo Jerusalem Report, (March 23, 2020)
Ofer Aderet, &ldquoMilitary Intelligence Chief Misled Israeli Leaders Ahead of 1973 War, Declassified Doc Reveals,&rdquo Haaretz, (May 9, 2020).

*In the United States, the October 1973 war is typically referred to as the Yom Kippur War. Because the war was fought during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the Arabs and Muslims refer to it as the Ramadan War.
**An intelligence controversy exists over whether Marwan was a double agent. We will never know Marwan fell to his death under mysterious circumstances in 2007.
***Ironically, Sadat was assassinated during a parade in Cairo in 1981 celebrating Egypt's &ldquovictory&rdquo in 1973.

Descargue nuestra aplicación móvil para acceder sobre la marcha a la Biblioteca Virtual Judía


History revised: The missing chapter of the 6th of October War

Our Armed Forces, with its Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy and Air Defense, played a symphony repeating powerfully and with faith the motto of the Ramadan war: God is great He put an end to the wrong saying that the Israeli military is invincible in less than six hours. Our martyrs have written with their blood the most glorious page in our modern history, a precious and strong victory, and Egypt&rsquos flags flew over the precious land of Sinai. God is great.

With these words, a military voice bolstered with pride ends its narration of the 1973 war in the October War Panorama. This military museum was inaugurated in 1983 to commemorate the events of the war, also known as the glorious October victory.

The initial six hours of the war celebrated in the panorama, in which Egypt achieved a sweeping military success by means of a surprise attack, is also perhaps the only detail that many Egyptians know of the war, which continued for an additional eventful 20 days &ndash&ndash though there is no mention in the panorama.

While all concede that Egypt had initial military success and emerged from the war with considerable political gains, sources from inside the Egyptian military and historians say there&rsquos much more to the war, which has somehow escaped the Egyptian consciousness.

Veterans and historians say the official narrative of the war leaves out a major military setback that Egypt suffered and that took it to the verge of defeat.

Zachary Lockman, professor of modern Middle East history at New York University, says it&rsquos clear that from a military point of view, it wasn&rsquot the great victory that former President Anwar Sadat claimed it to be.

&ldquoIt was at best a stalemate … but it was a political victory,&rdquo he says.

Initial victory

The events of the first few days of the war are uncontested.

On 6 October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous attacks that succeeded in taking Israel completely by surprise. The attack caused grave damage to its forces and especially its most powerful branch, the air force.

The war came after six years of preparations and sporadic attacks between Egypt and Israel following Egypt&rsquos crushing defeat in 1967, which cost it the Sinai Peninsula. The initial airstrike opened the way for Egyptian troops to climb over the Bar Lev wall, a defense line erected by Israel along the Suez Canal to protect its 1967 gains, into the occupied territories to the east of the canal.

Simultaneously, military engineers created holes in the wall hailed as one of the strongest in the world, using water hoses. They also built bridges for Egyptian tanks and heavy equipment to cross into the east of the canal.

&ldquoThe perception of the war in Egypt is partially correct about the first two days, but not what happened after that,&rdquo says Avi Shlaim, professor of international relations at Oxford University and author of &ldquoThe Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.&rdquo

Shlaim says Egypt&rsquos success in surprising Israel and crossing the canal is recognized as an impressive military achievement.

Israel&rsquos failure to predict and prepare for the attack was considered a huge scandal, and is something the Israeli intelligence is still being questioned about to this day.

&ldquoWe had a lot of superiority factors at the beginning. We succeeded in implementing the elements of surprise and initiative &ndash&ndash it was military planning at its highest levels,&rdquo recalls Bilal Barakat, a retired general who headed an artillery unit during the war. &ldquoAfter six years of intense and realistic training, the troops were able to perform the crossing almost on auto mode.&rdquo

Starting on 13 October, however, Barakat says the situation was reversed.

Beyond the canal crossing

What happened after that can&rsquot be found in most records of the war in Egypt, whether in school curriculums, media or political speeches.

Historian Assem al-Dessouky argues that Sadat wanted to convince the Egyptian people that the war ended with the crossing of the canal to cover up his strategic mistakes later in the war.

With Sadat hailed as the mastermind of the October victory and toppled President Hosni Mubarak celebrated as the leader of the initial airstrike, both presidents had vested interests in propagating the war as an unquestionable victory, and prohibiting any questioning of the events during their rule.

Saad Eddin al-Shazly, military chief of staff at the time of the war, was dismissed in December 1973 after clashing with Sadat and Defense Minister Ahmed Ismail over several strategic decisions during the course of the war. He was marginalized by the regime.

Only after Mubarak&rsquos ouster in 2011 were Shazly&rsquos memoirs, &ldquoOctober War,&rdquo published in Egypt &ndash&ndash revealing a very different view.

&ldquoHistory will attest that … Egyptian officers and soldiers have all exerted their best effort and had the greatest performance, but that Egypt&rsquos ruler at the time, hungry for power and for the spotlight, has aborted their victory,&rdquo Shazly writes.

Following Egypt&rsquos initial success, Shazly recounts that Sadat and Ismail insisted against field commanders&rsquo advice on expanding the attack further into Sinai. Following the failure of the attack, Sadat committed what Shazly calls his second strategic mistake, bringing in reinforcements from reserve troops in the west, leaving the forces at the canal with little backup.

While Egyptian forces were suffering heavy losses in the east, Israeli troops were able to cross to the west of the canal through a gap between the Egyptian second and third armies.

Following the elation of the crossing, Barakat remembers the Israeli advancement into the west of the canal as &ldquopainful.&rdquo

As the roles were reversed and Egyptian losses started to exceed Israel&rsquos, Sadat still refused to end his attempted attack on the east and return the reserves to the west to fend off the attacks, Shazly writes.

By the time a United Nations ceasefire was imposed, the Israeli forces had advanced 35 kilometers into the west of the canal, completely surrounding the third army and cutting it off from its leadership. In the absence of organized troops, an attempted attack on Suez city on 24 October was fended off mainly by civilian fighters.

&ldquoThey were less than one hour away from Cairo,&rdquo says Barakat, adding that, based on the deteriorating state of the forces on the ground, accepting the ceasefire and resorting to a diplomatic resolution was inevitable.

Shazly says with the third army under siege and getting supplies only from Israelis, Egypt was forced to abide by Israel&rsquos conditions in the ceasefire treaty.

Meanwhile, Egyptians celebrated the announced victory. &ldquoWhile these humiliating procedures were occurring on the political and the military levels, the Egyptian people were the last to know, like a deceived husband,&rdquo writes Shazly.

&ldquoI consider it an incomplete victory. It would have had a true sweet taste if it weren&rsquot for the Israeli penetration,&rdquo says Barakat. Lockman says that, hungry for a source of pride following the humiliating 1967 defeat, Egyptians were not too skeptical of the victory announcement.

Not a military victory, but a victory nonetheless

While most historians contest Egypt&rsquos claim that it ended the war with a military victory, all concede that the war still created a lot of damage to Israel and enabled Egypt to make important gains.

&ldquoIsraelis don&rsquot see the war as a defeat, but they see it as a very costly war,&rdquo says Shlaim. He says this war destroyed many misconceptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict that Israel depended on. Even though it had the upper hand on the ground by the end of the war, Israel emerged from it &ldquoweakened, politically and militarily.&rdquo

These misconceptions include the idea that Egypt was neither willing nor able to engage militarily with Israel, and that the Israeli military was invincible.

The war also forced the US to have a more balanced view of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Shlaim argues, finally considering the Arab dimension as a factor in its policies. &ldquoIsrael couldn&rsquot have everything its own way [anymore], and the US shifted towards resolving the conflict,&rdquo says Shlaim.

Prior to the war, Sadat&rsquos attempts to initiate a diplomatic resolution that would restore Egypt&rsquos occupied land failed, as neither Israel nor the US was interested.

Many historians argue that Sadat did not initiate the war with the aim of accomplishing a complete military victory, but to create an international crisis that would force the major powers to intervene and make limited gains that it could use as leverage in negotiations, and in that sense, he has accomplished exactly his goal from of the war, they say.

A peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979, returning all of Sinai to Egypt except for Taba, which was returned later through international arbitration, while limiting the presence of Egyptian troops in the peninsula. In return, Egypt formally recognized Israel and committed to a collaborative peace with it.

Proud of the accomplishments and heroism of the Egyptian military in the October war, Barakat says he hopes the public gets to know its full history, stripped of any manipulations that serve personal or political interests.

&ldquoI would have wanted the people to know everything about the war with complete transparency. No army is victorious all the way,&rdquo says Barakat.


Today in History: Born on October 23

Nicolas Appert, the inventor of canning.

John Bartlett, lexicographer best known for Bartlett's Quotations.

Sarah Bernhardt, French actress.

John Heisman, American college football coach for whom the Heisman Trophy is named.

Johnny Carson, American television personality who hosted the Tonight Show.

Pele, legendary Brazilian soccer player who scored 1,281 goals in 22 years

Michael Crichton, writer (Parque jurásico, The Andromeda Strain).

Fatmir Sejdiu, first President of the Republic of Kosovo (2006– ).

Altug Taner Akcam, Turkish historian and sociologist among the first Turkish historians to discuss the Armenian genocide sued Turkish government before European Court of Human Rights for denying his rights, under a law that punishes incidents of insulting "Turkishness."

Ang Lee, Taiwanese-born American film director won Academy Award for Best Director in 2005 (Brokeback Mountain) and 2012 (Life of Pi).

Alfred "Weird Al" Yankovic, singer, songwriter, satirist known for his humorous rewrites of popular songs and parodies of pop culture.

Doug Flutie, collegiate and pro football quarterback won Heisman Trophy and Davey O'Brien National Quarterback Award (1984).

Princess Mako of Akishino, first-born granddaughter of Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko.


Ver el vídeo: CRONOLOGÍA SOBRE OCTUBRE NEGRO, LA GUERRA DEL GAS (Junio 2022).


Comentarios:

  1. Lannie

    Ya está lejos no excepción

  2. Beltane

    Bien hecho, qué palabras ..., una excelente idea

  3. Awan

    Voluntariamente acepto. El tema es interesante, participaré en la discusión.

  4. Rashad

    la respuesta oportuna

  5. Thyestes

    Gracias, lo intentaré



Escribe un mensaje